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(Title) 
THE SUBPRIME MARKET ROLLER COASTER  
 
The subprime lending market can be likened to a roller coaster descending with 
ominous velocity after an exhilarating ride.  The ascent of the subprime roller coaster ride 
was phenomenal, the rips and waves were exhilarating, and the top was breathless.  
However, its descent, which has no visible end, has changed both the faces of its riders 
from joy and exhilaration to weary and worry and has scarred the face of our economy.  
The riders include the usual cast of characters – commercial and investment bankers, 
non-bank lenders and investors – found at the center of most financial market losses 
threatening the stability of the economy and creating the real risk of systemic loss.  But 
this time, as the coaster descends, a group of unsuspecting riders – scores of debtors 
obligated on variable rate mortgages – also bear worrisome and weary facial expressions.   
And afar, the faces of those who opted not to ride witness its descent with perplexed and 
disconcerted faces knowing that they will have to pay for the price of the ride.    
For years, state and federal government agencies responsible for regulating 
lending and securities practices watched the reckless, sometimes fraudulent behavior of 
mortgage brokers, mortgage lenders, securities firms, and investment banks in the 
subprime market.  They did nothing of substance to halt such practices almost as if they 
were complicit with the lending and securities industries fueling the subprime market. 
They watched as subprime losses began changing the face of our economy.  Now 
financial markets are illiquid and key economic sectors – housing, job, and credit markets 
– essential to the country’s economic health are depressed.  
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Until recently, the Treasury Department (Treasury), the Federal Reserve (Fed), 
the Office of Comptroller and Currency (OCC), the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), along with state banking failed to utilize its regulatory authority in any significant 
manner to stymie the burgeoning losses.  Most likely, their apparent complicity stemmed 
from President Bush’s mandate that every American citizen should be able to enjoy 
homeownership.  A mistaken view that suggests home ownership is a right, not a 
privilege.  Obviously, federal government regulators did not foresee that the costs of their 
complicity would overshadow the esoteric and economic benefits citizens received from 
their ephemeral enjoyment of home ownership. While subprime debtors obtained the 
American dream, they did so at enormous cost to the economy, only to have to surrender 
that dream because of the economic consequences of the lending practices that enabled 
them to purchase homes in the first place.   Ironically, the subprime lending practices 
hailed as a means for providing homeownership to those who historically could not 
access the housing market has rendered the housing market stagnant.    
During the subprime market heyday, mortgage brokers forcefully solicited and 
lenders aggressively extended mortgages loans using lax lending standards to earn 
lucrative loan fees.   They made loans to applicants’ whose credit lenders traditionally 
used as a basis to deny them credit; and uncharacteristically, lenders even crossed the 
“redline” (historically, lenders drew an imaginary redline around poor inner city areas 
over which they would not cross to lend money.)  Hence, the loans were called 
“subprime.”   The demand for subprime mortgages was enormous.  Current estimates 
indicate that over 10 million subprime mortgages have made by lenders.    
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Subprime mortgage debtors fell into one of three categories.  The first category 
included debtors that entered mortgage contracts with low teaser rate mortgage payments 
knowing that reset provisions in their contracts would cause their mortgage payments to 
increase beyond their income capacity within two to three years of the loan’s inception.  
The second category included debtors who, at the inception of the loan, knew that their 
incomes could not service their initial mortgage payment amounts.  These two categories 
of debtors knowingly incurred mortgage obligations beyond their income capacity 
speculating that in the short term their home values would increase sufficiently to enable 
them to refinance at lower mortgage payment amounts.  The third category included 
debtors who were victims of predatory lending.  They did not know their mortgage 
payments would increase.  They were deceived about the nature and terms of their 
mortgage loans by mortgage brokers and lenders.  Nor did they know about the reset rate 
provisions contained with their mortgage contracts.  Of the estimated 10 million plus 
subprime mortgage loans many contain reset rates provisions that still have not been 
activated.   
Lenders made substandard loans because they knew they could shift the risk of 
loss associated with such loans by securitizing their subprime mortgage receivables.  
Lenders pooled their mortgage receivables into trusts, and Wall Street investment banks 
securitized the mortgage pool by slicing them into specialized debt securities referred to 
as “collateralized mortgage obligations” (CMOs), whose yield was contingent on debtors 
paying the mortgage debt underlying the CMO.  Investment banks received millions of 
dollars in fees from lenders, and lenders were poised to collect from investment banks 
certain future cash flow payments from the pool of mortgage receivables securitized.    
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More than a million CMOs were purchased by investors – primarily institutional 
investors including pension and hedge funds, as well as foreign central banks.  Strong 
investor demand for CMOs fueled the subprime mortgage market.  Investors purchased 
numerous CMOs relying on the debt securities’ triple-A ratings, instead of engaging in 
due diligence to determine the worth of the loans and real estate underlying their CMOs.  
The lack of transparency in the CMO market was to the detriment of investors.  Even 
though numerous documents concerning the securitization of the mortgage receivables 
underlying CMOs were available, for the most part, investors did not have skills to 
determine the validity of the CMOs.  Even for those who possessed such skills, the 
evaluation process would have involved an inefficient use of investors’ resources in light 
of the number of mortgage receivables securitizing just one CMO debt security. 
The lack of transparency enabled lenders to engage in rent-seeking behavior 
misusing CMOs to externalize the cost of making substandard loans.  Lenders employed 
a liberal, sometimes deceptive application of the Three Cs of credit lending – credit; 
capacity and collateral.  Lenders mechanically used credit scores as a basis for 
determining applicants’ creditworthiness, without analyzing applicants’ credit reports.  
Credit reports include a wealth of credit information such as bankruptcies, judgments, 
late payments, repossessions and other negative information.  A credit score may reflect 
the negative information, but it does not provide the lender with that information.  
Knowledge of negative credit information provides the lender with more information on 
which to assess an applicant’s creditworthiness.  Nevertheless, subprime lenders 
mechanically applied credit scores in lieu of analyzing credit reports knowing they would 
not have to internalize the costs of making loans to non-creditworthy loan applicants.  
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Subprime lenders also applied liberal, sometimes reckless methods of determining 
a debtors’ income.   Usually, mortgage loan applicants are required to provide lenders 
with wage statements and 3 to 5 years of federal tax returns to verify income.  
Abandoning traditional lending standards, subprime lenders made loans with little or no 
verification of income.  In many cases, lenders relied on applicants’ representations of 
their income amount; and lenders used that figure to determine their capacity to repay 
their mortgage loans.   
Typically, lenders determine debtors’ ability to repay by calculating its debt ratio, 
which is the percentage by which net monthly income exceeds monthly payment 
obligations.  They usually include within a debtor’s monthly obligations the amount of 
the new mortgage payment, and they also make adjustments as needed to reflect any 
future payment increases.  If an applicant’s debtor’s ratio is 50% to 55%, lenders become 
very conservative in their lending, and at higher capacity ratios, they usually deny an 
applicant’s loan request.   Abandoning traditional capacity measurements, subprime 
lenders approved applicants’ loans even though their debt ratios far exceeded 55%.  They 
also failed to include the increased monthly obligations debtors would incur once reset 
rate provisions contained in their mortgage contracts were activated.   
Subprime lenders also abandoned the traditional lending standards used to 
evaluate homes collateralizing their mortgage receivables.  Generally, lenders hire 
appraisers to engage in an independent evaluation of a home.  The “comparative 
approach” is the most common method used by appraisers evaluating residential real 
estate.   Utilizing that approach, appraisers evaluate a home by comparing its structure, 
age, functional utility, acreage, and quality to at least 3 residential homes within the 
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neighboring vicinity that were sold within the past 1 or 2 years.  Subprime lenders also 
used appraisers, but the appraisers were instructed by lenders to manipulate their 
appraisals with a goal towards insuring that homes were valued at, or greater than their 
sales price. Some subprime lenders abandoned the appraisal process altogether, instead, 
they relied on computer models to determine the values of homes.    
Subprime lenders also abandoned the traditional practice of limiting financing 
amounts to 80% of a home’s value.  Even lower loan-to-value percentage rates have been 
used by lenders when the age, quality, structure of the home or the neighborhood in 
which the home is located requires a larger cushion to protect against default.  Limiting 
the loan value ratio insures that sufficient equity exists in the home; thus, better 
protecting the lender’s position.  Subprime lenders provided 100% or more financing to 
accommodate subprime debtors who, characteristically, could not afford to make down 
payments.  In some cases, lenders provided more than 100% financing, giving the 
difference to the debtors as kickbacks.  On paper, the appraised values appeared 
sufficient to sustain the mortgage balances they were underwriting, but in reality the 
homes were worth far less.  The true values became apparent when debtors sought to 
refinance mortgage obligations at lower interest rates because their income could not 
service their existing mortgage payments.  The majority of refinance requests were 
denied because the homes collateralizing the subprime mortgages were worth far less 
than the mortgage obligations.  
By abandoning the Three Cs of credit, lenders built a circular house of card, 
whose foundation was built with CMO debt securities and whose walls were fortified 
with the illusion of strong housing values.  Lenders began drawing the circle by making 
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substandard loans collateralized by overvalued housing.  The circle’s curve descended as 
lenders pooled the mortgage receivables collateralized by overvalued homes.  The 
circle’s curve ascended as the CMO debt securities generated from the securitization 
process were sold to investors.  Investors completed the circle by demanding that lenders 
securitize additional mortgage receivables; thus, creating an incentive for lenders to make 
more substandard loans.   However, the investors did not know that both the mortgage 
receivables underlying, and the homes collateralizing the CMOs were worth far less than 
they appeared.   
The weak link in the circle was overvalued housing.  Once debtors were denied 
refinance requests, the house of cards started falling down and the foundation came 
crumbling after it.  Faced with debtor defaults, most CMO investors sought recourse 
against the real estate property collateralizing their CMOs.  While others recouped their 
losses from originating banks against which they had recourse for defaulted mortgage 
obligations.   In some cases, investors were forestalled from foreclosing on real estate 
because the securitization paperwork was so deficient that neither lenders nor investors 
could determine which homes actually securitized an investor’s CMO debt securities.   
The lack of transparency in the CMO market prevented investors from knowing 
the true value of the debt securities they were purchasing.  They relied on the Triple-A 
ratings that most CMOs enjoyed.  At the time, their reliance appeared reasonable given 
the conservative reputation of the bond rating agencies that provided those ratings.  
Traditionally, the rating agencies’ culture was one of aloofness toward their clients 
requesting that the agencies evaluate and rate their debt securities.  The conservative 
environment insured the integrity of their ratings and gave them a well-deserved 
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reputation.  During the subprime market boom however, rating agencies became more 
accommodating to their clients in an effort to increase their market share.  Rather than 
being aloof, top management socialized with their clients as they rated most of their 
clients’ debtor securities Triple-A.  The impropriety of their relationships explains the 
inaccurate ratings and has prompted regulators to investigate the manner in which rating 
agencies evaluated CMOs.  
As debtor defaults revealed the true value of CMOs and as investors incurred 
losses, investor demand for CMOs decreased substantially.  Without investor demand, 
lenders had no secondary market to which they could shift their risk of loss; thus, no 
opportunities to earn lucrative loan fees and investment bank payments.  Consequently, 
they restricted subprime credit facilities.  Prime credit facilities were also restricted as 
lenders had to make billion dollar subprime mortgage receivable write-downs.  The 
absence of credit has created a credit crunch.  And, the consequence of the credit crunch 
is our failing economy.  Now, its apparent that the strength of the housing market was 
just an illusion and that the value of the CMOs, which fueled the market, was based on 
that illusion.  
The results of the illusion are found in numerous neighborhoods throughout the 
country.   In the millions, subprime debtors have defaulted on their mortgage loans, and 
in many instances, have abandoned homes in which they were never really vested.  Some 
subprime debtors are barely holding on their homes, while others have become subject to 
foreclosures.  A map depicting the inner cities would show areas concentrated with 
abandoned homes and foreclosure signs.  On many streets, all or almost all of the homes 
are foreclosed or abandoned.  Suburban areas have also fallen victim to subprime 
 9 
lending.  The Census Bureau recently indicated that nationwide home vacancies have 
risen 2.8% in the last quarter of 2007, which is the highest vacancy rate since the Census 
Bureau began monitoring them in 1960.  Throughout the country, cities are compelled to 
pay for yard and pool maintenance and security to protect the homes against vandals.  
The foreclosures and abandonments have prompted local officials to deliberate on how to 
prevent speculators, who mostly likely would become absentee landlords, from 
purchasing the homes.  Also, they are faced with increased homeliness causing them to 
deliberate on how to find residences for displaced subprime debtors.  Many of these 
debtors are frequenting local charities whose inventory of food and clothes have 
decreased substantially because of the increased demand.     
Now, the ominous descent of the roller coaster is upon us.  Numerous debtor 
defaults have prompted many banks and other lenders to tighten their credit standards.  
Lenders have moved from one end of the spectrum, reckless lending, to the other end, 
overly strict lending, the former causing financial meltdowns in the economy, and the 
latter, exacerbating the financial mess they created.  Driven by their greed, mortgage 
brokers and lenders engaged in reckless, and in some instances fraudulent behavior 
without any consideration of how such practices would impact the financial health of our 
economy.  Consistent with that self-centeredness, the same very lenders are now 
tightening the screws without such consideration. Their credit restrictions have caused 
enormous collateral damage creating liquidity problems throughout the economy.   
The burning question is:  What were our federal regulators doing during the initial 
descent of the subprime market?  As the subprime market was descending into a 
recession, federal and state government regulators did very little to stymie the losses.  
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The Treasury, the Fed, OCC, SEC, and state regulatory authorities are primarily 
responsible for regulating the financial markets.  They all watched as commercial banks 
and other lenders, mortgage brokers, credit rating agencies and debtors behaved 
recklessly, and in some cases, deceptively, taking enormous bets on an overvalued 
housing market.  Perhaps, to some degree, regulators inactions reflect their receptivity to 
Wall Street’s demand for less regulation in the financial markets.  However, as the story 
unfolds, it appears that their inaction was primarily due to their inability to foresee the 
impact that subprime losses would have on the economy.   
Historically, regulators have been slow to react in any substantial manner to 
burgeoning financial market losses involving the misuse of esoteric financial products 
until such transactions seriously began to threaten systemic loss in the financial markets.  
In the past 20 years, time and time again, financial market regulators have watched as it 
became evident that certain impending losses involving trade transactions with esoteric 
financial products had the potential to threaten systemic loss in the markets. The misuse 
of esoteric financial products like CMOs at varying times has caused enormous losses in 
the market threatening the possibility of systemic loss in the markets.  Some examples 
include the massive losses incurred by Orange County, West Virginia, Long Term 
Capital Management, and Enron.  In each case, the parties’ were investing heavily in 
esoteric financial products.  In each case, financial market regulators knew or should 
have known that these losses would be problematic for the financial markets and the 
economy, but in each case they watched, and only responded once the transaction had 
imploded.   
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Repeatedly, regulators have waited until a massive loss was imminent before they 
implemented any remedial measures to prevent systemic loss.    Regulators repeated this 
pattern with subprime mortgage and CMO losses.  They all watched as the financial 
markets incurred burgeoning losses from the misuse of CMOs, only engaging in 
substantive measures after trade transactions have destabilized the markets.  Consistent 
with risk taking behavior, these products are very popular even though investors can lose 
billions when investing on the wrong side of trade transactions.  Their popularity stems 
from the potential to earn enormous profits if an investor bets the correct way.  Also, they 
provide protections to investors that successfully use them to hedge against the possibility 
of loss from other trade transaction within their portfolio.  Financial markets also benefit 
from them because they allow investors to further diversify their portfolio, especially 
those investors who have an appetite for risk.  To insure maximal economic benefits from 
these transactions, these transactions must be monitored carefully to protect against their 
misuse and the consequent losses that stem from such misuse.  
When the subprime descent began, regulators’ posture concerning subprime 
losses was rather lackluster.   The Fed, OCC and state regulators did issue subprime 
lending guidelines to banks (the guidelines did not apply to unregulated lending 
institutions) regarding appropriate subprime lending practices.  Apparently, the regulators 
did not adequately examine subprime loans against their own subprime lending 
guidelines.  Because, a basic examination of just a sample of subprime loans would have 
revealed their substandard nature and alerted regulators to the extent to which lenders had 
deviated from the subprime guidelines.      
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In 2003, Democrats in Congress did request that the Fed devise rules to penalize 
banks for unfair and deceptive practices, but then Chairman Alan Greenspan refused to 
devise such rules.  Recently he stated that he “erred in thinking that other investors and 
market participants would adequately monitor lending standards in the mortgage-backed 
securities market.”  The Office of Comptroller and Currency defended its position by 
noting that only 10% of national banks over which the OCC has control were part of the 
subprime mess, as if that justified their lackluster response to subprime losses.   Instead, it 
pointed the finger at state regulators for failing to regulate both their state-chartered 
banks and other lenders subject to their regulatory authority.  The evidence suggests that 
OCC’s position has merit.  For example, in 2006, New Century, a major subprime lender, 
passed a California state audit, but seven months later they were insolvent because of 
numerous subprime mortgage defaults. 
The Securities and  Exchange Commission also has been criticized for it failure to 
identify risks associated with CMO trading, and its failure to insure that investment banks 
and securities firms were not make false or misleading representations about the value of 
the CMOs they were offering to investors.  Specifically, the SEC has come under heavy 
criticism for its failure to identify the liquidity problems at Bear Sterns, a major player in 
the securitization of mortgage receivables.   
Much would have been gained had regulators performed their appointed 
functions.  Had the Fed used its monetary tools to increase the interest rate environment 
to discourage lending and to devise rules penalizing fraudulent lending practices (as 
recommended by Congress in 2003) it might have thwarted the country’s current 
economic crisis.  Had the SEC used its regulatory authority to review the valuation 
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process used by investment banks and securities firms that securitized mortgage 
receivables, it could have discovered that they were over evaluating future cash flows 
from CMOs to receive millions of dollars in fees from lenders.  It could have discovered 
the fraudulent practices employed by investment banks and securities firms to entice 
investors to purchase worthless CMOs.  It could have discovered that the securitization 
practices of investment banks and securities firms threatened their liquidity positions.  It 
could have discovered that rating agencies had compromised their integrity in light of the 
social relationships they were fostering with their clients.  Having discovered any of the 
above irregularities, the agency could have used its enforcement authority to sanction 
violators.  
Had the OCC and state regulators worked in tandem, rather than engaging in turf 
wars, they could have readily identified and sanctioned regulated entities whose subprime 
loans failed to comply with subprime lending guidelines.   Regulation and enforcement 
actions by one of these governmental regulators would have caused a chilling effect that 
would have deterred other entities from high risk speculation on the value of the 
residential market.   In addition, had banking and securities regulators engaged in more 
than passive examinations of subprime loans they would have discovered the extent to 
which banks and other lenders had abandoned the traditional Three Cs’ credit standard.  
Perhaps, that would have alerted them that the CMOs securitized by those subprime 
mortgages were worthless, and that their triple-A ratings were suspiciously inaccurate. 
Their inaction reflects their inability to appreciate and grasp the speculative nature 
of esoteric products such as CMOs, and their inability to foresee how financial market 
players may misuse them in ways that might threaten the liquidity of the economy.   Time 
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and time again, the government has failed to educate itself concerning the risks involving 
such products, only to emerge on the scene after the fact, brandishing regulatory weapons 
that should have been employed much earlier.   Even, former Fed Chairman Alan 
Greenspan admits that the risk and econometric models used by the Fed were too simple 
to forecast the massive losses and their impact on the economy.  
Admittedly, regulators were handicapped with respect to forecasting the overall 
economic impact subprime losses could have on the economy.  However, they should 
have foreseen that lenders would misuse CMOs to engage in rent-seeking behavior, and a 
review of subprime loans and securitization documents would have substantiated that 
misuse.  Documentation review would have disclosed the irregularities in the lending and 
securitization practices; thus, providing a justification to impose sanctions.  Those 
sanctions would have served as deterrent to other lenders, securities firms, and 
investment banks to engage in more conservative practices in compliance with the 
regulatory rules governing their lending and investment practices.   
 The price tag for the regulators’ lack of competence and diligence will be 
astounding as the subprime losses/credit crunch story unfolds.  Even now estimates 
indicate a government bailout of subprime debtors will cost over $200 billion to purchase 
10 million subprime mortgages.  Subprime losses threaten to render the financial markets 
illiquid, and the credit crunch resulting from the losses has depressed the housing and 
labor markets causing prominent economists to posit that the country is in a recession.  
The market value of CMOs held by investors has decreased by more than $200 billion.  
Commercial banks and lenders are taking billion dollar write-downs for those mortgage 
receivables underlying CMOs that provided investors a right of recourse against them and 
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for those subprime mortgages that were not securitized.  Credit markets also have been 
severely impacted by subprime losses.  Investment banks and securities firms are taking 
billion dollar write-downs on their CMO holdings. And like domestic banks, foreign 
investments banks with large CMO holdings are devaluing CMO values in the tunes of 
billions of dollars.   
Securities markets are strained as investors uncertain about the market’s liquidity 
have turned away from equity and debt securities.  The Dow Jones Index is plummeting, 
and even when it occasionally makes a gain, the following day the gain is offset by an 
equal decline.  Bear Sterns, a major securities firm recently sold its assets to J.P. Morgan 
at the prompting of the Fed at a fire sale price.  The Federal Reserve pushed the deal 
because Bear Sterns was financially crippled by its supply of uncollectable CMO 
securities, and two large hedge fund losses.  Without the intercession of J.P. Morgan, its 
financial decline was imminent.  The Federal Reserve feared that Bear Sterns’ financial 
demise would have relentlessly disrupted financial markets and triggered systemic loss.  
The global markets trading CMOs also have been impacted by subprime market losses.    
Housing markets are glutted with an oversupply of new homes constructed when 
the housing market was “booming.”  The glut is attributing to the downward slide of 
home values throughout the country.  The glutted market has also caused increased 
unemployment rates in construction and other related industries.  In addition to the 
construction industry, employers in other industries are downsizing their businesses and 
laying off existing workers.  They are also reluctant to hire new workers.  Overall, the job 
market is in a slump.  February employment figures indicated that the unemployment rate 
had increased from 4.8% to 4.9%.  While this increase may appear minimal, the Labor 
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Department indicated that 4.7 million people who wanted jobs cannot find them 
prompting them to leave the job market.  The 4.9% employment rate does not include 
them.  If those individuals are included in the unemployment figure the rate increases 
from 4.9% to 5.5%.  
Only after subprime losses have brought the economy to halt, did the federal 
government emerge on the scene as “Johnny Come Lately.”  Predictably, the 
governments’ knee-jerk reaction to the financial crisis has been to hastily promulgate new 
regulations and enact new legislation to protect the economy against massive subprime 
losses.  As usual, regulators and legislators a pushing new regulations and legislation 
without any serious deliberation whether existing regulatory laws could have thwarted 
the subprime losses had regulators utilized them.   
It is quite apparent that the current regulatory powers granted to banking and 
securities regulators were more than sufficient to avert those losses; thus, negating the 
need to create new laws.  The Fed had sufficient regulatory authority to rein in lenders 
engaging in reckless or fraudulent behavior.  The Divisions of Corporate Finance and 
Market Regulation of the SEC had the authority to monitor and detect irregularities in the 
CMO markets; and to determine to what extent the securitization of mortgage receivables 
threatened the liquidity of any investment banks or securities firms.  The SEC’s 
Enforcement Division had the authority to initiate investigations to determine whether 
sanctions were necessary for any of the practices in which investment banks or securities 
engaged concerning the securitization process, as well as the practices they used to sell 
CMOs.  The regulatory authority of the OCC and state banking regulators were more 
than adequate to identify and sanction those lenders that engaged in lending practices in 
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violation of its rules and guidelines.  No new laws are needed.  All that was needed were 
zealous regulators willing to exercise the authority given them under existing regulatory 
frameworks.    
However, the knee-jerk reaction has predictably prevailed.  Recently, the 
Treasury announced sweeping changes to remodel U.S. financial regulation and 
streamline the patchwork of regulatory agencies whose authority often overlaps.   The 
plan grants the Fed a significant increase in regulatory power to render it the “super cop” 
of the financial markets.  Presumably, the Fed would monitor and assess financial risk to 
determine whether risky trade transactions threaten systemic loss.  Towards that goal, the 
plan proposes the elimination or merger of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
which Treasury Secretary Paulsen has blamed for the CMO losses.  Most likely, the 
Treasury’s plan will lay stagnant in this election year.  In reality, the plan reflects a hasty 
and hurried proposal to respond to public concerns without any real deliberation 
concerning how to prevent misuse of them or whether CMO debt securities should be 
used to fuel the residential housing market in light of the devastating effects of their 
misuse by lenders.  
Moreover, the plan is disingenuous.  The Treasury’s proposal to eliminate or 
merge the SEC reflects its attempt to deflect all the blame for subprime losses from the 
Fed, banking regulators and the Treasury to the SEC.  Banking regulators and the 
Treasury had an obligation both to monitor subprime lending and securitization practices, 
and to halt such practices threatening the liquidity of banks and other regulated lenders.  
The SEC was responsible for regulating the CMO market, but the CMO debt securities 
traded in that market were generated by lenders for which banking regulators were 
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responsible. Both banking regulators and the SEC were responsible for the subprime 
losses and the consequent credit crunch.  Either party could have averted the subprime 
losses.  To choose one party over another reflects a bias and disingenuous approach taken 
by the Treasury to escape public scrutiny.    
The Treasury’s disingenuous approach is evidenced by its earlier position that the 
Treasury was taking a hands-off approach to the subprime debacle.  Before the recent 
economic decline, Secretary Paulsen posited that the market forces would squeeze out the 
inefficient lenders.   Admittedly, principles of economic efficiency compel firms to exit 
an industry if they become unprofitable when market forces require them to internalize 
their negative externalities.  In this case, the negative externalities are the subprime losses 
stemming from lenders’ substandard loans.  Unfortunately, the institutions affected by the 
market squeeze as they internalize the costs of subprime mortgage defaults are the major 
financial institutions on which the economy has traditionally relied as a source of 
liquidity.  This reality compels the government to rescue these institutions abandoning a 
strict compliance to the free market theory as necessary to protect the health of the 
economy for the livelihood of its citizens.   
In that vein, faced with a recession, the Federal Reserve is trying to bandage the 
wounds of the investment banks and securities firms holding CMOs.  Rescue relief is 
directed towards the financial markets because its current illiquidity is a major threat to 
the country’s economic stability.  In an effort to stimulate the economy, the Federal 
Reserve has successively reduced interest rates five times.  The most recent federal funds 
rate decrease from 3% to 2.25% was an aggressive move by the Federal Open Markets 
Committee.   Also, the Federal Reserve has created a lending facility providing primary 
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dealers (those to which the Fed sells Treasury securities) credit funding up to $200 billion 
in Treasury securities to help “revive strained financial markets.”  Primary dealers can 
use various types of collateral including CMOs to secure credit obtained through the 
lending facility.  The Federal Reserve is extending the payback period to 28 days from its 
usual overnight period.   It is also providing a lending facility for other securities dealers. 
In addition, the Treasury Department has authorized Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to 
reduce their capital requirements from 30% to 20% so that they can purchase up to $200 
billion in CMO securities.  And, the SEC has initiated an investigation of Bear Sterns to 
determine if it engaged in fraudulent or misleading practices in connection with the 
mortgage receivables it securitized and sold to investors.  
As the government scrambles to forestall a recession, the economic impact of 
subprime mortgage lending begs the question whether lenders should be allowed to use 
CMOs in residential markets.  Initially, CMOs increased liquidity in the housing market 
because they were securitized by collectable subprime mortgages.  But as lenders began 
engaging in rent-seeking activities they abused CMOs as risk-shifting devices to justify 
making subprime substandard loans.  Their abuse erased any liquidity gains derived from 
the securitization of collectable loans.   
Outside of the real estate context, securitization has provided liquidity to the 
credit markets and the economy.  Historically, the securitization of receivables has 
provided lenders more flexibility in lending by allowing them to make loans to persons 
with less than prime credit profiles knowing that they could shift their risk of loss to the 
CDO market.  Well before the emergence of the subprime market, lenders were 
securitizing receivables including collateral debt obligations (CDOs) such as credit card, 
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automobile and student loan receivables.  Although recently, lenders are reporting 
increased debtor defaults in the automobile and credit card markets.  Nonetheless, 
consumers and businesses have benefited from “securitization” because it has provided 
them with more credit; thus facilitating their ability to spend and to invest money, both of 
which enhance the economy’s liquidity.  Increased lending activity also benefits lenders 
because it provides them opportunities to earn additional loan and credit card fees.  
However, problematic to the CDO market generally including the CMO market is 
their lack of transparency rendering it difficult to assess the true value of the debt 
securities traded in those markets.  For the most part, the quality of subprime loans went 
undetected for so long because the only evaluations of CMO debt securities were the 
ratings given them by rating agencies, which failed to accurately evaluate them.  
Investors had access to documents from which they could have evaluated the 
collectability of the mortgage receivables; however, such evaluations would most likely 
have involved an inefficient allocation of their resources.  In lieu of reviewing numerous 
documents, investors relied heavily on the Triple-A ratings that bond rating agencies 
gave CMO debt securities.  Apparently, many of the investors assumed that the rating 
agencies, which are subject to regulatory authority, would provide accurate ratings.  
However, these agencies had conflicts of interest since they were being paid by the 
originating banks to rate the CMOs that investors were purchasing.  In an effort to bring 
greater transparency, federal regulators are currently drafting rules identifying the factors 
that rating agencies will be required to analyze in evaluating CMOs.   
Also problematic to the CDO market and to CMO market specifically is the lack 
of lender accountability for the substandard loans made by lenders.  The lack of 
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accountability encouraged lenders to make substandard loans since they could use CMOs 
as risk-shifting devices. To preserve the integrity of employing CMOs as risk shifting 
devices without jeopardizing the stability of the housing markets, some have called for 
regulation that requires lenders to retain all or part of the risks associated with making 
subprime mortgages.  Regulators could promulgate an implied warranty of collectability 
rule in which lenders warrant the collectability of their loans.  A breach of that warranty 
could render lenders monetarily liable in treble damages based on the defaulted mortgage 
obligation amount.   In addition, sanctions could be imposed on lenders whose lending 
practices were grossly negligent, reckless, or fraudulent.  Confronted with possible 
monetary damages and sanctions, most likely, lenders would tighten their lending 
standards.  Tightened lending standards would decrease consumer demand to those 
applicants with more creditworthy profiles.  
The fundament problem in using CMO debt securities as risk-shifting devices in 
residential real estate market is that such lending threatens the integrity of the housing 
market.  The securitization of mortgage receivables uncharacteristically encourages 
lenders and their debtors to speculate on one of the country’s major infrastructures – 
residential real estate.  Regulations increasing transparency and rendering lenders 
accountable for defaulted subprime mortgage loans may contain decrease subprime 
losses, but neither law will relieve the speculation problem.   In fact, the creation of such 
laws would suggest that the federal government is implicitly endorsing such speculation.   
Speculation stems from the securitization process.  The genesis of the CMO 
market was based on the desire of investors and lenders to speculate on the housing 
market; and its viability was dependent on the parties continued desire to speculate.   
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Investors, motivated by the potential to earn lucrative dividends, wanted a market in 
which they could speculate on the collectability of mortgage obligations collateralized by 
homes against which investors had recourse if debtors defaulted.  Lenders wanted a 
market in which they could earn loan fees from making mortgage loans without having to 
bear the risk of loss associated with those mortgages. They speculated that investors in 
the market would always bear the risk of loss.  Lenders provided 100% or more financing 
to subprime debtors calculating that their risk of loss was minimal in light of the CMO 
market.  Like investors and lenders, debtors also speculated on home values.  They 
speculated that homes would significantly appreciate in value enabling them to pay for 
mortgage obligations, which at the time of consummation they could not afford.  The 
origin and life blood of the CMO market was speculation.  Without it, the market could 
not survive.  We are witnessing its slow death because no one wants to speculate on 
home values at the present time. 
Securitization severed the traditional creditor-debtor relationship which promotes 
both parties vested interest in the homes securing mortgage obligations.   The parties’ 
divorce severed that vested interest.  The CMO market was created because the lender 
wanted to sever that relationship to earn lucrative loans fees without assuming the risk of 
loss associated with mortgage lending.  Without a vested interest, lenders did not think 
twice about providing debtors 100% or more substandard financing.  The lucrative 
financing obviated debtors from having the type of vested interest that debtors ordinarily 
have in their property.  Without that vested interest, subprime debtors had no problem 
obtaining loans they could not afford.  They speculated that their homes would appreciate 
in value to allow them to refinance their mortgage obligations at an affordable interest 
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rate.  Speculation fever not only infected willing investors and lenders, but also the 
subprime debtors.     
The numerous abandoned and foreclosed home throughout the streets of America 
reflect the consequences of such speculation in the country’s residential real estate.  Even 
with implied warranties, the CMO market provides a safe haven that will, to some extent, 
serve as an incentive for lenders to overextend.  While the implied warranties will make 
lenders cause lenders to engage in traditional lending practices, as long as they can shift 
the risk of loss to the CMO market, they have an incentive to make loans.   Admittedly, 
CMO investors will invest with greater caution and rating agencies will provide more 
conservative ratings.  However, the profit lenders can earn from making loans without 
having to bear the risk of loss will encourage them to overextend themselves.  Most 
likely, they will focus on prime debtors including those whose capacity ratio is high and 
whose credit profile is less than stellar.  Prime debtors represent a compromise that the 
investment community would be willing to purchase, especially those debtors with high 
incomes earned in professional jobs and sufficient net worth.   In many instances, 
however, prime debtors over extend themselves in light of their income sources.  Lenders 
overlook their high debt ratios speculating that loans to such debtors are collectible given 
their credit, employment status, and net worth.  However, their excessive spending keeps 
them on edge tittering to avoid bankruptcy.   
Driven mainly by greed, lenders, mortgage brokers, and debtors thought they 
could outwit the obligatory pricing components of home ownership, getting something 
without incurring any significant economic costs.  In reality, all they were doing was 
externalizing such costs to the cities and states throughout this nation that currently are 
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struggling to maintain their identity as their landscapes are deteriorating.  The costs have 
also been externalized onto our nation’s economy.  Many believe these costs should be 
internalized and the market forces should be allowed to squeeze out inefficient parties, 
even at the price of a recession.  Perhaps, the economy wants to take a rest to emerge as a 
leaner and more pristine machine in the future.  That decision will be left to the federal 
government.  So far it has decided to rescue market players.  It also appears poised to 
rescue subprime debtors.   
Some view its decision to provide both parties relief as creating a moral hazard – 
providing a safety network that will merely encourage market players to continue 
engaging in reckless behavior knowing they will not have to incur the costs of their 
behavior.   Others view such relief as necessary to stabilize and to provide liquidity to the 
financial markets and the economy.  Either way, the costs will be borne by the taxpayers.  
If the government rescues the roller coaster riders, taxpayers will pay the price of the 
rescue.  If the government chooses not to rescue the riders, the taxpayers will be the 
victims of the subprime-loss induced-recession.  Alternatively, if the government rescues 
efforts do not thwart a recession, taxpayers will be the victim of recessionary forces.  
Whatever the government chooses, the costs of its choice will be borne by the taxpayers.  
We look at the subprime lending transactions and just wonder:  What were they 
all thinking – the debtors, the commercial and investment banks, other lenders, mortgage 
brokers – as they shifted risk from one to another motivated by greed?  But more 
importantly, what was the government doing and are its rescue regulatory efforts too late 
to remedy the financial turmoil the country is undergoing?  Moreover, does the Bush 
Administration, Congress and regulators have sufficient foresight to appreciate how the 
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CMO market threatens the integrity of the country’s landscape begging questions 
whether securitization of mortgage receivables should be permitted?  
During the heyday of the housing market, few would even discuss the possibility 
that the housing market would eventually go flat; or that scores of debtors’ would default 
as interest rates rose.  But both did happen because the government turned a blind eye to 
subprime lending practices for too long.   
As the government scrambles to devise the “great plan” that will solve the 
country’s economic woes, the Bush Administration, financial regulators, and market 
participants should consider the overall societal, as well as economic consequences of 
using CMO debt securities to fuel the residential housing market.  The integrity of our 
country’s residential real estate has been tarnished by the misuse of CMO debt securities.  
Perhaps, using them to fuel the residential housing market should be banned.  The 
country’s land was once nurtured by the hopes, aspirations, toils, and labors of people 
who struggled and fought for the real estate on which they ultimately settled.  That 
landscape has been ravaged by subprime lending practices and securitization.  The fruit 
harvested by the CMO securitization process is a landscape that is glutted with new 
homes and spotted with abandoned and foreclosed homes; and also stunted growth due to 
economic and societal problems consequent to vacant homes and credit woes.  This 
landscape is a stark contrast to the landscape that those before us nurtured. The 
government should slow down its regulatory overhaul mindset, and in its stead, weigh the 
costs of preserving the integrity of the country’s residential real estate and the social and 
economic wellbeing of its citizens against the benefits of promoting wealth maximization 
for a few (the transactional versus distributive justice discussion.) 
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As the roller coaster descends, from afar, people who opted not to ride the 
subprime market, witness its descent into the shadows of a recession with anxious and 
perplexed faces.   Now, the worry and weariness seen on the faces of those who rode on 
the subprime market is seen on the face of our country as the velocity of the descent has 
substantially impacted major sectors of our economy, as well as sectors of the global 
markets.  As usual, the ordinary citizens will have to pay for the recklessness and 
criminal acts of others, who, motivated by sheer greed, have endangered the financial 
health of our country and substantially weakened its credibility in the global arena.  
 
 
